

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS, POST PLENARY DISCUSSIONS, JULY 7, 1976
(SALT TWO 1055)

1. (KLOSSON/KARPOV, A-1357)

DATA BASE ARTICEL XI

KARPOV SAID THAT LISTENING TO AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT TODAY HE RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE CAME UNDER THE 2400 LIMIT ON OCTOBER 3, 1977, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR THE DATA BASE PROPOSED BY THE US. KLOSSON SAID KARPOV'S INTERPRETATION WAS INCORRECT. TODAY'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED TO POINT OUT THAT THE RATIONALE FOR THE DATA BASE PROPOSAL RESTED ON A LARGER FOUNDATION.

2. (ROWNY/SHCHUKIN, A-1358)

A. DATA BASE ARTICLE XI

SHCHUKIN ASKED WHY WERE WE PUTTING CONDITIONS ON US ACCEPTANCE OF ARTICLE XI? ROWN REPLIED THAT THE US STILL THOUGHT IT BEST THAT THE SIDES BE WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE BY
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OCT 3, 1977. HOWEVER, IF THE SIDES WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON THE NUMBERS

BY CATEGORY, BY THE TIME OF SIGNATURE, WE WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO PERMIT SPECIFIED TIME PERIODS BEYOND OCTOBER 3, 1977 FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OR EXCESS ARMS. AFTER ROWNY WENT OVER THE RATIONALE FOR OUR DATA BASE PROPOSAL, SHUCHUKIN SAID HE WOULD BE FORCED TO CONCEDE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN FEWER AMBIGUITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES IF WE COULD AGREE ON NUMBERS. HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS, HOWEVER A MATTER OF "HIGH POLICY".

B. NON-CIRCUMVENTION -NON-TRANSFER

SHCHUKIN ASKED WHY COULD NOT THE SIDES AGREE ON ARTICLES XII AND XIII NOW RATHER THAN WAIT, ESPECIALLY SINCE BOTH SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER? ROWNY SAID WE WANTED FIRST TO BE CERTAIN OF WHAT WE WERE AGREEING UPON THEN AN AGREEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER ARTICLES COULD QUICKLY FOLLOW.

C. THROW WEIGHT DEFINITION

SHCHUKIN SAID HE FELT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT WE TRIED TO EXPLAIN "OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICES" IN TERMS OF WHETHER OR NOT SUCH DEVICES MET THE 15PERCENT VELOCITY CRITERION. HE SAID VELOCITY CONNOTED DIFFERENT IMAGES TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE AND DID NOT EXPLAIN THE FUNCTION OF SUCH DEVICES. HE EXPLAINED THAT GREATER VELOCITY COULD MAKE FOR A GREATER RANGE OF THE ENTIRE MISSILE FOR FOR AN EXTENDED RANGE OF THE REENTRY VEHICLE. SHCHUKIN AGREED THAT WE WERE TRYING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE TARGETING AND BOOSTING FUNCTIONS BUT THOUGHT WE WOULD BE BETTER OFF CONFINING SUCH DESCRIPTION OF THOSE FUNCTIONS TO ADJECTIVAL FORMULATIONS RATHER THAN NUMERICAL ONES. HE ADDED THAT THE PERCENTAGE FIGURE WAS TOO HIGH AND IF IT WERE A SMALL FIGURE, SAY 5 OR 10 PERCENT, OUR RATIONALE WOULD BE MORE CONVINCING. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT MORE DISCUSSION BETWEEN DELEGATES AND WITHIN THE WORKING GROUP WOULD BE HELPFUL. IT COULD RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM SINCE WE WERE BASICALLY IN AGREEMENT, BUT SO FAR HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PUT THAT AGREEMENT INTO WORDS.

D. "TYPE"

SHCHUKIN SAID THE MAJOR COMPLAINT WITH "TYPE" WAS THAT IT HAS TOO BROAD A MEANING IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE. UNDER THEIR USAGE, THE MMII AND MMII WOULD BOTH BE LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME "5603" HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE RELIED HEAVILY ON THE USE OF SECRET

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THE WORD "TYPE" IN BOTH OUR ICBN LAUNCHER AND MIRVD LAUNCHER DEFINITIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE WORDS "DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED" WERE SUFFICIENT FOR DESCRIBING LAUNCHERS OF INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES. HE ADDED THAT "DEVELOPING" WAS A SUBJECTIVE CRITERION SINCE IN THE BEGINNING ONLY THE DEVELOPERS KNEW WHAT HE HAD IN MIND AND WOULD NOT BE CERTAIN OF ITS SUCCESS UNTIL IT HAD BEEN TESTED. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE WORD "TESTING" TAKES ON GREAT SIGNIFICANCE, A

FACT HE THOUGHT WE HAD RECOGNIZED BY INCLUDING IT IN ARTICLE XVI.

IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION OF HOW A SIDE COULD RECOGNIZE WHICH LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN "DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED" FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS, SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT SUCH RECOGNITION WAS POSSIBLE THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE ADDED THAT IT COULD BE DONE THROUGH OBSERVING TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT.

E. DUAL CAPABLE LAUNCHERS

IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY AS TO HOW THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD COPE WITH THE QUESTION OF DUAL CAPABLE LAUNCHERS, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT THEY HAD PROPOSED TO BAN CONVERSION OF NON-ICBM LAUNCHERS TO ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THEREFORE THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT OCCUR. AS FOR THE SAME MISSILE GOING TO DIFFERENT RANGES, I.E. A MISSILE OF ICBM RANGE NEVER TESTED TO THAT RANGE, HE SAID THAT NO MILITARY PLANNER WOULD DEPLOY A MISSILE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN TESTED TO ITS MAXIMUM RANGE, A FACT WHICH THE OTHER SIDE COULD DETECT.

3. (EARLE/TRUSOV-BELETISKY, A-1360)

AM "TYPE"

EARLE POINTED OUT THAT PREVIOUSLY TRUSOV HAD SAID THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, "SILO-BASED LAUNCHERS" WERE A TYPE OF LAUNCHER WHICH COULD INCLUDE ICBNS AS WELL AS AMS SUCH AS SPRINT AND SPARTAN. EARLE ASKED TRUSOV WHAT WORD IN RUSSIAN WAS USED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SPRINT AND SPARTAN. TRUSOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY SIMPLY REFERRED TO THEM AS "SPRINT MISSILES" AND "SPARTAN MISSILES" EARLE ASKED, IF A SOVIET GENERAL WERE QUESTIONED AS TO HOW MANY ICBM LAUNCHERS THE UNITED STATES HAD, WOULD HE NOT REPLY WITH A FIGURE AROUND 1,000? TRUSOV REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. EARLE THEN SAID THAT IN THE US VIEW, IT HAD THREE TYPES OF ICBM LAUNCHERS: MINUTEMAN II, MINUTEMAN III, AND TITAN II. IN THIS CONTEXT, IF THE SOVIET GENERAL WERE ASKED A QUESTION TO WHICH THE

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ANSWER WAS "THREE," WHAT WOULD BE THE QUESTION? TRUSOV DID NOT SUPPLY THE ANSWER, BUT RESTATED HIS ARGUMENT AGAINST THE WORD "TYPE".

B. ICBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION -MAY 26, 1972

TRUSOV SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE DATES HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE DEFINITION OF AN ICBM LAUNCHER. EARLE POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREED STATEMENT ON SLBM LAUNCHERS REFERRED TO DATES AND, IN FACT, EXCLUDED FROM THE AGREEMENT CERTAIN SOVIET SLBM LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE STILL OPERATIONAL. TRUSOV REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS AS AN ANALOGOUS SITUATION AND REPEATED HIS PREVIOUS ARGUMENT THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE DEALT WITH UNDER ARTICLE VI REGARDING THE STATUS OF SYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED. EARLE REPEATED THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD OFFERED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM EITHER AS WE HAD PROPOSED IN THE AGREED STATEMENT OR WITH A SIMILAR AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE PARTIES REGARDING SYSTEMS DEACTIVATED AND NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT. EARLE SAID THAT THE "HOLE IN THE GROUND" OR "OBJECTS" WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE DISCUSSION WERE NOT LAUNCHERS. TRUSOV SAID, "I AGREE --IT IS JUST A QUESTION OF IDENTIFYING THEM."

4. (SCHNEITER-STOUT/PAVLICHENKO-JOURAVLEV, A-1352)

BOMBER VARIANTS

SCHNEITER ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT WHICH SAID BOMBER VARIANTS COULD NOT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER BE USED OR CONVERTED FOR USE AS HEAVY BOMBERS. JOURAVLEV REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND TANKER AIRCRAFT, AND IF THESE AIRCRAFT WERE CONVERTED TO BOMBERS THESE FUNCTIONS WOULD NOT BE PERFORMED. SCHNEITER ASKED IF IT WAS PRIMARILY A MATTER OF LEAVING THOSE MISSIONS UNCOVERED, AS OPPOSED TO THE EXTENT AND DIFFICULTY OF THE PHYSICAL CHANGES REQUIRED. JOURAVLEV POINTED OUT THAT EXTENSIVE MODIFICATION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE BOMBERS OUT OF THESE AIRCRAFT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE "JUNK" AFTER SUCH WORK. HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE JUST AS HARD TO MAKE SUCH A CONVERSION AS IT WOULD FOR THE US TO CONVERT ITS KC-124S TO BOMBERS. BOTH PAVLICHENKO AND JOURAVLEV STATED THAT THE SOVIET TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE, AND ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SECRET

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BUILT FROM THE BEGINNING FOR THEIR PARTICULAR ROLE AND WERE NOT CONVERTED BOMBERS. STOUT ASKED; "ARE YOU SAYING THAT THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE AT NO TIME IN THEIR LIFE CYCLE BEEN CONFIGURED AS BEING BOMBERS"? THEY BOTH REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, STATING THAT THE DECISION TO PRODUCE THESE AIRCRAFT WAS MADE BEFORE PRODUCTION AND FURTHER, THAT THE US COULD TELL THE DIFFERENCE BY ITS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. JOHNSON

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